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Human rights are more than principles to guide the national and
global response to AIDS: they are among the most powerful tools
to ensure its success.1
. Introduction
Paying the Price,2 a short film produced by Television Trust for the
Environment to publicize the need for affordable AIDS medicine in Africa,
begins masterfully. In documentary fashion, the cameras follow a Ugandan
J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2005; B.A., University of Florida, 2002.
I would like to thank Professors Harlan Beckley and Mark Drumbl for their thoughtfiul suggestions in the
development of this paper.
See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES (2002) (introducing new Guidelines for understanding human rights principles in the context
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic).
2 PAYING THE PRICE (Television Trust for the Environment, U.S. Release 2002). The transcript
for the film is available at http://www.tve.org/lifeonline/index.cfm?aid=l 174.
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boy's visit to the doctor in Kampala. According to the video voice-over,
Vincent is fourteen years old, but he looks younger. He is small for his age
and severely underweight. His skin is stretched so tight and thin that his ribs
threaten to break through. Vincent seems frightened-and with good reason.
Viewers learn from the commentary that both his parents have died from
AIDS, and now Vincent is suffering from AIDS-related meningitis because,
"[t]he antiretroviral drugs that could save his life are too expensive for most
people in Africa."3 In the West, antiretroviral drugs have "transformed AIDS
from a death sentence to a chronic illness and saved thousands of lives," but
even at the reduced price of $300 per year, the drugs remain out of reach for
the 25 million Sub-Saharan Africans suffering from HIV and AIDS.
4
Paying the Price eventually pans from Vincent's story to focus on its
target, the large pharmaceutical companies that control patents and prices for
AIDS medication. The film concludes with the question, "Can the drug
companies go on ignoring growing outrage from around the world-and still
protect their patents and profits?" 5  It is a potent message. One look at
Vincent's frail body and frightened face and the audience is ready to say, "To
hell with patents; get this boy some drugs."
However, activist groups do not have a monopoly on propaganda.
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), one of the world's larger multinational
pharmaceutical companies, has launched its own campaign to educate
Americans on the importance of drug patents and profits.6  In an
advertisement aired on network television, a GSK scientist explains that
developing the latest lifesaving heart-disease medicine took lots of time and
lots of money.' Where do the profits from the medicine go? According to
the GSK scientist, the money goes "down the hall," where researchers are
working toward a cure for Alzheimer's disease. The ad ends with the tagline,
"Today's medicines finance tomorrow's miracles."8  The pharmaceutical




6 See Tracy Krisanits, GSK Rolls Out Corporate Ad Campaigns, 39 MED. MARKETING & MEDIA
9 (2004) (reporting on GlaxoSmithKline's campaign aimed to increase awareness of the pharmaceutical
industry's research function).
7 This advertisement aired on network television stations in the spring of 2004. For more
information about the advertisement campaign featuring GlaxoSmithKline scientists, see David Ranii,
GSK Aims to Soften Image; Two New Ads; One Stars Scientist, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar.
14, 2004, at El (noting that the ad campaign was, in part, a response to negative publicity GSK had
received for the prices it charged for AIDS medicine in Africa).
8 See Krisanits, supra note 6 (quoting the slogan from the advertisement's conclusion); Ranii,
supra note 7 (same).
TOOLS FOR SUCCESS
reminding the viewer why prescription drugs are exorbitantly expensive.
Society wants a cure for Alzheimer's, right?
The juxtaposition of the film and the ad highlights the tension
between patent rights, which play an important role in the research and
development of new medical technology, 9 and the urgent need for access to
affordable drugs, especially in nations that are experiencing an AIDS crisis.
However, like all good works of propaganda, both film and ad go too far.
Paying the Price opens with the following claim from the Brazilian Minister
of Health: "And what is our case? Simply that access to medicines is a basic
human right.'"1  Clearly, his statement must be qualified-there will be no
human rights crusade for free distribution of Viagra, or even for equal access
to state-of-the-art cancer treatment. Equally far-fetched, however, is the
notion that pharmaceutical companies must charge exorbitant prices and
enjoy unlimited patent protection to continue research and development.
Today's medicines may finance tomorrow's miracles, but they also fund
generous salaries for the CEOs of pharmaceutical companies.l" Furthermore,
the GSK advertisement raises the question of whose "miracle" the profits are
funding. Americans may be willing to fund research and development for a
miracle pill that alleviates depression without sexual side effects, but there is
considerably less financial incentive for providing the miracle of life without
malaria or tuberculosis, diseases peculiar to developing nations."
9 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION & WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO AGREEMENTS
AND PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO AND THE WTO SECRETARIAT 92 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/res-e/bookspe/whowto e.pdf (noting studies have demonstrated that
pharmaceutical patent protection are the most important factor for research and development decisions).
Strong intellectual property protection is key to pharmaceutical companies because of the effectiveness of
pharmaceutical patents, the high costs of research and development, and the fact that, in the absence of
patents, generics can be produced at a very low cost-thus reducing the commercial benefits of research
and development. Id.
'0 See PAYING THE PRICE, supra note 2 (translating a statement from Jose Serra, Health Minister
of Brazil).
See Gardiner Harris, Will the Pain Ever Let Up at Bristol-Myers, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003,
at S3 (noting that in 2001 the chairman and chief executive officer of Bristol-Myers Squibb, Peter Dolan,
"received a compensation package the company valued at $12.9 million-including $10.6 million in long-
term incentives, mostly stock options...."); Bloomberg News, World Business Briefing Europe: Britain:
Drug Maker Names Chief N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at WI (reporting that the newly appointed
executive chairman of GlaxoSmithKiine, Sir Christopher Gent, will be paid $434,760 in cash for serving
as deputy chairman, with additional compensation in the form of corporate shares and a significant raise
when he becomes chairman); Melody Petersen, Lifting the Curtain on the Real Costs of Making AIDS
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at C2 (finding that GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers Squibb spent a
significantly larger percentage of their revenue on advertising, marketing, and administrative costs than
then they did on research).
12 But note that according to the company's website, GlaxoSmithKline is committed to
researching and developing treatments for diseases that primarily affect developing nations. See
GLAXOSMITHKLINE, DEVELOPING WORLD CHALLENGES: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE (last updated Apr.
28, 2003), http://www.gsk.com/about/developing_world.htm (articulating the company's commitment to
developing nations). The website makes the following declaration:
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The truth lies somewhere in between. There is a general consensus
that intellectual property rights must be tempered by health considerations, 3
and the current regime of international law regulating patent rights attempts
to balance the need for intellectual property rights with the need for access to
affordable medicine. 14 The question now is not whether intellectual property
law should reflect health considerations, but rather how to define the
relationship between intellectual property and human rights.
11. Overview of the International Law Concerning
Intellectual Property and Public Health
Patent rights are a creation of domestic law. 15 In 1994, the Member
states of the newly formed World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to
work toward global protection of intellectual property rights. 16  From its
inception, TRIPS has acknowledged the nexus of intellectual property rights
and public health. 7 In particular, TRIPS addressed the special needs of
developing states in the area of pharmaceutical patents: although the
Agreement entered into force with respect to developed Members in January
We strongly believe we are making an important contribution to the improvement of
healthcare in the developing world. We will continue with these and other efforts, focusing on
areas where we can make the most difference and helping to find imaginative ways of making
our medicines available and accessible to developing countries, as part of a more holistic
approach to care.
ld.
I'3 Even the United States, the most vocal and powerful proponent of strong intellectual property
rights, has acknowledged the need for flexible patent laws in light of public health concerns. See Bebe
Loff& Mark Heywood, Patents of Drugs: Manufacturing Scarcity or Advancing Health?, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 621, 627 (2002) (discussing the demands for drugs to combat anthrax). In the face of the anthrax
incidents following the September 11 th terrorist attacks, the United States and Canada threatened to break
the patent for Ciproflaxicin if Bayer did not agree to reduce the price of the drug. Id. As one
commentator noted, "[tihe parallels with the demand for AIDS medicines were unavoidable." Id.
14 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex I C, Legal INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 8 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2005) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement] (noting right of Member states to protect and promote public health).
15 In the United States, patent rights are contained in Title 35 of the United States Code. See 35
U.S.C.S. § 101 (2004) (defining patentable inventions). For a brief history of the development of patent
law in the West and in developing nations, see Sridvidhya Ragavan, Can't We All Get Along? The Case
for a Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 121-28 (2003) (tracing the history of patents from
the fourteenth century to the present, and noting that "economic gains were the main motive for the
development of patent policies").
16 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 27
(2003) (describing the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement).
7 See id. at 46 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement emphasized from the beginning that it "should
not prevent WTO Members from taking measure to protect public health, and that the TRIPS Agreement
should be interpreted in that manner").
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1996, developing nations had until January 2005 to implement the provisions
regarding pharmaceutical patents, and least-developed nations are not
required to provide pharmaceutical patent protection until 2016.18
Furthermore, Article 8 of TRIPS, which applies to all Member states,
addresses the need to balance patent rights and public health by permitting
states to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition," as
long as "such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement."' 9  Additionally, Article 30 states that Members may make
limited exceptions to patent rights, "provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent. '20 Together,
these provisions are intended to provide Member states the flexibility to draft
patent laws that take public health considerations into account. The
provisions are vaguely worded, however, and require that any measures
taken to protect health remain subject to the other terms of TRIPS.2'
Specifically, Article 31 allows governments to mandate
manufacturing of generic pharmaceuticals if good-faith negotiations with the
patent holder fail. 2' The practice of government-mandated manufacturing
without the authorization of the patent holder, commonly termed
''compulsory licensing," has been the topic of recent controversy over
pharmaceutical patents and access to medication.23 Recent negotiations over
is Id. at 47. The extension for least-developed Member states emerged from the Doha Ministerial
Conference on TRIPS and Public Health in 2001. Id. at 27 n.2.
19 The full text of Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: "Members may, in formulating or
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 8.
20 The full text of Article 30 states: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 30.
21 See Loff & Heywood, supra note 13, at 623 (quoting a United Nations Commissioner on
Human Rights report, which stated "The various links [in TRIPS] with the subject matter of human
rights-the promotion of public health, nutrition, environment and development-are generally expressed
in terms of exceptions to the rule rather than the guiding principles themselves and are made subject to the
provisions of the Agreement").
22 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 31 ("Where the law of a Member allows for other
use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be
respected ... ").
23 See Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, Proposal on Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/35 (June 24, 2002),
http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Joint Communication] (noting the ineffectiveness of the compulsory
licensing provisions and calling for a number of measures to solve the problem, including a moratorium
on claims against Members that take action to alleviate public health crises in states without
manufacturing capacities); Second Communication from the United States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/358, (July 9, 2002),
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TRIPS focused on Article 31(f), which limits the distribution of drugs
manufactured under compulsory licenses: "Any such use shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use. 24 Because Article 31(f) restricts the exportation of
medicines manufactured under compulsory licenses, TRIPS did not offer an
effective solution for nations without the capability to manufacture drugs.
25
In other words, even though TRIPS did not require developing nations to
extend patent protection to pharmaceuticals until 2005 or 2016, the
exemption from patent law did not increase access to affordable medicine
because Article 31(f) prohibited Member states from importing generic
medicines from countries where the pharmaceuticals were patented.26 For
example, Brazil could legally obtain a compulsory license to manufacture
generic AIDS medicine to alleviate its domestic epidemic, but exporting
those same drugs to African nations would run afoul of the WTO laws.27
Under this interpretation of Article 31(f), developing nations that lack the
capacity to manufacture their own generic medicines could not take
advantage of the compulsory licensing provision.28
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of Article 31 and the public health
problems facing developing and least-developed nations without
manufacturing capability, the WTO addressed the compulsory licensing issue
at its Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.29 Paragraph
http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Second Communication) (acknowledging that Member states
without manufacturing capability cannot make effective use of compulsory licensing under trips, and
suggesting a waiver or moratorium of Article 31 (f) for those states only).
24 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 31 (f).
25 See Joint Communication supra note 23 (citing proposals on the compulsory licensing
problem); see also World Trade Organization, Press Release, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to
Cheap Drug Imports, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres03 e.htm [hereinafter Press
Release] (discussing the effect of Article 31(0 on countries that cannot produce pharmaceuticals
domestically).
26 Id.
27 See Doug Alexander, Canada's New Plan for Generic-Drug Sales, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 25, 2004, at I (discussing the practices of Brazil and India, "which have been exporting
AIDS knock-off drugs to Africa, but in violation of WTO rules").
28 I say "this interpretation of Article 31(0" because in the negotiations following the Doha
Ministerial Conference, some nations advocated reading "predominantly for the domestic market" to
mean that 49.9% of the generics could be exported. See Joint Communication from the African Group in
the WTO, supra note 23, at para. 6(d) ("Further, the requirement in Article 31(f) that the supply be
predominantly for the domestic market of the Member issuing the compulsory license, [sic] should be
interpreted to mean that up to 49.9 percent of the production can be exported."). While the suggested
"49.9%" interpretation would allow for some exportation of drugs, it was not a satisfactory solution
because it illogically made the supply of AIDS medicines for a nation without manufacturing capacity
dependant on the need for AIDS medicines in the manufacturing countries.
29 See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) para. I [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (recognizing the public
health problems facing developing and least-developed nations, especially problems "resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics"); see id. at para. 6 (recognizing that Members with
little or no manufacturing capacities cannot effectively use compulsory licensing under TRIPS).
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Six of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, called for a
solution to the compulsory licensing question by the end of 2002. 30 After
lengthy negotiations that were heavily influenced by arguments from the
African Group (comprising all African Member states), the WTO finally
reached an agreement on August 30, 2003 to allow a waiver of Article 3 1(f)
for nations that need to import generic drugs.3 1 The August 30 Agreement
allows any Member state to export medicines made under compulsory
licenses to any other Member state, subject to a number of conditions,
including notification to the TRIPS Council, remuneration to the patent
holder,32 and safeguards to ensure that the products produced under
compulsory licenses are not diverted from the "public health purposes
underlying their importation."3 3 The agreement does not limit which states
can take advantage of the waiver to Article 3 1(f), although many developed
nations announced that they will not use the system to import drugs.
34
Furthermore, although it refers to "public health," the agreement never
defines the permitted purposes for implementing the waiver.35 The General
Council Chairperson's statement issued along with the agreement, however,
notes that "Members recognize that the system that will be established by the
Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health.
3 6
30 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Paragraph 6 states:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem and to report to the General Conference before the end of 2002.
Id. at para. 6.
31 See Press Release, supra note 25 (discussing the negotiations leading up to the agreement and
its provisions).
32 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing remuneration to the patent holder).
33 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH: DECISION OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF 30 AUGUST 2003, Sept. 1, 2003, WT/L/540, http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/trips e/implem
para6_e.htm [hereinafter August 30 Agreement].
34 See Press Release, supra note 25 (noting that 23 developed countries are on record stating they
will not use the system to import; another eleven countries have announced that they will use the system
only in emergencies).
35 See August 30 Agreement, supra note 33 (defining "pharmaceutical product" as a patented
product of "the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems as recognized in
paragraph I of the Declaration").
36 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Intellectual Property: The General Council Chairperson 's
Statement, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.wto.org/English/newse/news03_e/tripsstat_28aug03_e.htm
[hereinafter General Council Chairperson's Statement].
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A. Human Rights and Defining a Health Exception to Patent Rights
Although the new trade agreements are promising steps toward
making access to AIDS medication a reality for developing nations, the
WTO negotiations and agreements noticeably avoid any overt recognition of
human rights. Instead, the debate has focused largely on the more general
notion of "public health." Although public health considerations are crucial
to the development of responsible patent laws, the public-health focus does
not acknowledge what Paying the Price termed as "a basic human right to
access to medicines.
3 7
Focusing on public health, to the exclusion of individual human
rights, results in less effective laws to achieve access to AIDS medicines.
The WTO's patent laws should include recognition of basic human rights to
life and health, which in turn encompass a minimum and universal right to
affordable essential medicines. The right to medicine must be defined in
limited, justiciable terms that establish a practical standard or continuum of
health.38
Drafting and interpreting trade laws in light of a defined human right
would avoid some of the problems currently surrounding the drug debacle.
First, defining a minimum right to medicine would offer more guidance than
the current "public health" language of the agreements, which leaves much to
the discretion of Member states. Pharmaceutical companies have legitimate
concerns under the recent waiver to TRIPS Article 31(f), because there are
no effective limits on which states can use compulsory licenses or on the
circumstances that trigger compulsory licensing.39  The provisions are
couched in terms of "good faith" 40 and are intended to be used by developing
nations for the purpose of alleviating epidemics and assisting nations that
37 Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health does affirm "that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all." Doha Declaration,
supra note 29. While the affirmation speaks to promoting universal access to medicine, it recognizes only
the state's right to promote access-not an individual right to demand access to medicine. Id.
38 See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text (defining the right to medicine).
39 Indeed, before the waiver to Article 31 (f) Member states had wide latitude to declare the need
for compulsory licensing. See Doha Declaration, supra note 29, at para. 5(b) ("Each Member has the right
to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted."). See also Ragavan, supra note 19, at 178 (noting that "[t]he wide definition of drugs in the
Declaration diminishes the line between important and necessary drugs," and that the wide definition of
"epidemics" will enable "developing nations to decide whether an epidemic is prevalent based on national
standards"); GERVAIS, supra note 16, at 251 ("In light of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health it seems that WTO Member are free, within reason, to determine what constitutes a national
emergency.") (footnote omitted).
40 See General Council Chairperson's Statement, supra note 36 (recognizing that the system
should be "used in good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the
Decision, not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial objectives").
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cannot manufacture their own medicines, 41 but there are no legal
qualifications to prevent abuse. A human rights definition could add clarity
to the purpose and scope of the exceptions to patent rights. The definition
would provide specific grounds for compulsory licensing and exportation
that would both require more exceptions to patent rights when individual
lives are at stake, and limit exceptions when only some vague notion of
public health or public good is at stake.
Second, if the WTO law recognized a basic human right to medicine,
states would have to respect the right as they implemented the provisions in
domestic law. 4 2 As states begin drafting and implementing patent laws that
reflect the flexibilities of the new trade agreements, they will likely face
opposition from pharmaceutical companies and, possibly, from the United
States.43 An unequivocal statement requiring that the TRIPS Agreement be
interpreted in light of a basic right to medicine could lend greater legal
certainty to the provisions regarding patent laws and health, and help curb
legal challenges to generic-friendly patent laws.
Finally, a human rights emphasis would ensure that a person's right
to medicine for a treatable disease would not be contingent on his ailment
reaching epidemic proportions or threatening "public health." Far from
adding confusion to the debate over patent rights, a well-articulated human
right to medicine could help clarify the intent of the new patent agreements
and rein in objections to their implementation.
41 See August 30 Agreement, supra note 33, at para. 4 (referring to the "public health purposes
underlying their importation").
42 The agreements reached by the WTO Members have to be executed through national
legislation; Canada has already begun the process. See Doug Alexander, Canada's New Plan for
Generic-Drug Sales, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 25, 2004, at 01 (discussing Canada's efforts to
implement the WTO August 30, 2003 decision), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/
0325/pOI s04-woam.html (Mar. 25, 2004).
43 See WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO AND THE WTO
SECRETARIAT 103 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/English/res e/bookspe/who-wto e.pdf
[hereinafter Joint Study] (discussing concerns about the whether the public health safeguards in the TRIPS
Agreement has enough legal certainty to protect it from challenges under other laws). Although the
United States has expressed views that TRIPS does not adequately protect intellectual property rights,
President Clinton issued an executive order in 2000 stating that his administration would refrain from
actions negatively affecting intellectual property laws applying to HIV/AIDS drugs, as long as the laws
were TRIPS-consistent. Id. President Bush reaffirmed the executive order when he took office in 2001.
Id. The executive order is limited to laws or policies affecting AIDS drugs benefiting Sub-Saharan
African countries, though, and does not apply to other medicines or developing nations; see id. at 104
(quoting Executive Order 13155).
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B. Defining the Right to Medicine
We already have some models for defining a justiciable right to
medicine. 44 Perhaps the most valuable tool available in the search for a
justiciable definition of the right to medicine is the World Health
Organization's (WHO) concept of essential medicines. The WHO defines
"essential medicine" as "those that satisfy the priority health care needs of
the population., 45 Public health systems must draw lines when supplying
medicines, and the WHO developed the concept of essential medicines to
help determine where the lines should be drawn.46 Over 156 nations have
adopted lists of essential medicines, and many use the lists when making
decisions regarding "the procurement and supply of medicines in the public
sector, schemes that reimburse medicine costs, medicine donations, and local
medicine production.
47
The definition of essential medicines will vary nationally depending
on local situations, but the WHO suggests the following criteria for
formulating a list of essential medicines: sound and adequate evidence of the
medicine's safety and efficacy in a variety of settings, the cost-effectiveness
of the medicine (compared to other medicines within the same category), the
availability of the medicine, and the capacity to store it in a stable
condition.48 Additionally, the WHO notes that most essential medicines
should be single compounds, with exceptions for AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis treatments.49  The list should also be reviewed and updated
often.50
While the WHO definition of essential medicines is not a "rights
definition," the WHO criteria could be used to develop a flexible standard for
a right, determined on a drug-by-drug basis. Because trade and patent laws
have a profound impact on access to medicine, perhaps the WTO should
explicitly defer to the WHO to define the parameters of TRIPS and the right
to essential medicines instead of referring to "public health." The WTO
could draft and interpret the TRIPS Agreement to fulfill the basic rights to
life and health, which include a right of access to essential medicines as
defined by standards established by the WHO. A statement of this type
44 One of the most well-developed legal definitions has been advanced by the Constitutional
Court of Colombia. See Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under
International Law, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 325, 340-41 (2003) (citing Alvarez v. Estado Colombiano,
SU.819/99, Corte Consitutional de Colombia (1999)).
45 WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines: The Selection of Essential Medicines 1 (2002),
http://www.who.int/medicines/library/edmgeneral/6pagers/ppmO4eng.pdf.
46 Id.





would be more effective than the vague language in TRIPS Article 8 that
subordinates public health to other provisions of the Agreement, 51 or the
affirmation in the Doha Declaration, which recognizes only the states' rights
to "promote" universal access to medicine.52
The WTO and WHO have already recognized the need to coordinate
their activities at the international level, as demonstrated in the regulation of
food safety.53 The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
Agreement specifically incorporates the standards and recommendations
promulgated by the WHO Codex.54 The link between the two organizations
makes perfect sense: the WTO is not equipped to establish scientific or
health standards, while the WHO has useful expertise to lend to health-
related trade decisions.55 In fact, the WHO has already advised countries on
options for integrating public health considerations into national patent laws
and on how to use the flexibilities of TRIPS to promote access to essential
medicine. 6 The WHO also has "observer status" in the TRIPS Councils and
WTO Ministerial Meetings. 57  By establishing a more formal connection
between the TRIPS patent regulations and the WHO recommendations for
essential medicines, the WTO could create a clear, scientific standard to
guide Member states as they implement the provisions of TRIPS and its
progeny.
The WHO could improve its definition of essential medicines by
fine-tuning the "cost-effectiveness" requirement. Patents affect the cost-
effectiveness of drugs,58 and patent status should not determine whether a
drug makes the essential medicine list. Also, the WHO should elaborate on
the concept of "priority health care" to ensure that it includes, in addition to
lifesaving medicines, medicines that substantially alleviate profound
impairments affecting normal health functions. This definition would
51 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 8 (allowing Members to take measures to "protect
public health" as long as the measures "are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement").
52 See Doha Declaration, supra note 29, at para. 4 (affirming that the TRIPS Agreement should
be interpreted to support of each Member's right to "promote access to medicines for all").
53 See JOINT STUDY, supra note 43, at 142 (discussing WTO and WHO collaboration in
regulating trade and food safety).
54 See id. at 142-43 (noting that "[t]he WHO's active presence at SPS meetings has allowed
WHO staff to provide advice on health matters relevant to trade. Examples are WHO's input on the risks
of mad cow disease ... to human health, and on the health effects of genetically-modified organisms in
food").
55 See id. at 143 (stating that "the WTO is not a scientific body and does not develop standards").
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See generally Loff & Heywood, supra note 13 (arguing that patents are the major determinate
of the price of medicine); see also COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 37-38 (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/Ch2final.pdf (discussing the correlation between
patents and prices in developed and developing nations).
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encompass not only medicines that treat life-threatening diseases such as
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but also treatments for chronic diseases such as
asthma and diabetes.59 The WHO has the knowledge and resources to
develop a justiciable, scientific standard that would help ensure that WTO
patent agreements are responsive to basic human rights.
C. Enforcing the Right
In addition to defining a justiciable right to medicine, it is important
to locate the right within a recognized fundamental human right. Most, if not
all, of the Member States of the WTO already have obligations under
international, regional, and national laws to recognize a basic human right to
life. International institutions and national constitutional courts are
increasingly interpreting the right to life to encompass a right to conditions
that sustain life, including a right to minimum standards of health.6 ° If the
right to medicine can be located within an established universal human right,
the Member states of the WTO would have a duty to ensure that trade laws
do not violate or impede the fulfillment of the right.
The United Nations Charter, a legally binding treaty, affirmed
respect for "fundamental human rights" in its preamble, and Articles 1, 55,
and 56 refer to the U.N.'s purpose of promoting "human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all.' 1  In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which set forth a
spectrum of human rights ranging from the basic right to life,62 to the more
esoteric right to the "free development" of one's personality.63 Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration expressly addressed the right to medicine, stating
that "[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
59 See World Health Organization, Chronic Conditions are Escalating (2004), http://www.who.int/
chronicconditions/conditions/en/print.html (discussing the lack of attention paid to chronic illnesses in
low income settings).
60 See Yamin, supra note 44, at 331 ("The right to life has generally been recognized to
encompass more than not dying as a result of actions directly attributable to the state, to extend to
conditions that permit, at a minimum, survival and, more broadly, to those that are conducive to dignity
and well-being.").
61 See U.N. CHARTER PREAMBLE. ("We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person ...."); 1d. at
arts. 1, 55 & 56; see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 2 (1997) (noting that the U.N. Charter, a binding treaty, pledges its
parties to promote health and higher standards of living).
62 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), G.A. Res. 217A (III) art. 3 (stating that
"[elveryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person").
63 See id at art. 22 (declaring that everyone is "entitled to realization.., of the economic, social
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality").
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housing and medical care. . .. "64 Although the language of the right to
medical care is unequivocal, the legal significance of Article 25 is debatable.
The Universal Declaration was initially adopted in the form of a General
Assembly resolution, which is not legally binding.65 In subsequent years,
however, the Universal Declaration has been cited countless times as
constituting a binding obligation on nations.66 In a 1980 human rights case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "several
commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in
toto, a part of binding customary international law., 67 That case, however,
dealt specifically with the Universal Declaration's prohibition against
torture.68 It seems more accurate to say that some provisions of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights have become part of customary law: the
provision protecting the right to health care has not attained the same status
in international law as the provision prohibiting torture.69 Without other
documents to reinforce the status of the rights contained in its articles, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights--on its own-probably does not
create a legally binding right to medicine, although the Declaration does
carry great moral and political significance.7 °
Most of the provisions in the Universal Declaration are also
embodied in the two paramount U.N. covenants on human rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).71  Unlike the Universal Declaration, the Covenants are both
legally binding treaties, 72 although their enforcement mechanisms differ.
64 Id. at art. 25.
65 Indeed, at the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration, Eleanor Roosevelt, the
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, stated that "In giving our approval to the declaration
today, it is of primary importance that we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is
not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or
of legal obligation." 19 DEPT. STATE BULL. 751 (1948) (quoted in Frederic L. Kirgis, Current
International Law 397 (2003)).
66 See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 61, at 4 ("Although [the Universal Declaration] was not
promulgated to legally bind member states, its key provision have so often been applied and accepted that
they are now widely considered to have attained the status of customary international law.").
67 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that torture violated the "law
of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute).
68 Id.
69 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 755 (citing Filartiga and acknowledging that the
prohibition of torture has achieved the status of an international norm, while denying that status to the
offense of arbitrary arrest).
70 See id. (stating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "does not of its own force
impose obligations as a matter of international law").
71 See PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (1983) (finding that the
"single [Universal Declaration] catalogue" of rights was divided between the ICCPR and the ICESCR).
72 See id. (noting that, unlike the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and ICESCR were designed
to legally bind the states).
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The ICCPR, signed by more than 150 nations including the United
States, recognizes an inherent right to life.7 3 The Human Rights Committee
of the U.N., the body that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has
interpreted the right to life to encompass obligations on the part of the state
to protect human life, including obligations to increase life expectancy and to
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.74 While an argument for the right to
medicine couldbe made under the ICCPR right to life, the enforcement
mechanism provided by the treaty does not offer much practical assistance to
individuals demanding fulfillment of the right. The Human Rights
Commission oversees state party compliance with the treaty by investigating
claims brought by one state party declaring that another state party is not
complying with the terms of the Covenant.7" The ICCPR does not provide
individuals with standing to bring complaints under the treaty. The First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR does provide standing for individuals to file
complaints with the HRC, but standing is only available to the citizens of
states that are parties to the Protocol-104 of the 153 parties to the ICCPR. 76
For individuals who are able to bring complaints, the remedy is not
necessarily satisfactory: the HRC will consider the claims and issue its
views to the state concerned and to the individual, but the HRC has no
77further enforcement power.
73 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc.
AA/6316/art. 6(1) (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
74 See Yamin, supra note 44, at 331 ("Specifically, the Human Rights Committee has defined the
role of the state in protecting human life to include obligations to reduce infant mortality, to increase life
expectancy, and to eliminate malnutrition and disease.").
75 See ICCPR, supra note 59, at art. 41 (explaining the procedure for bringing a complaint before
the Human Rights Committee). The Human Rights Committee will not receive claims against any State
Party unless that state has made a declaration recognizing the Committee's competence. Id. In addition,
the Human Rights Committee will not investigate a complaint until satisfied that the party has exhausted
domestic remedies. Id.
76 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 1 (1966)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol], http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/aopt.htm (declaring that a state
party to the Protocol recognizes the Human Rights Committee's competence to hear communications
from individuals within the state's jurisdiction "who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party
of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant"). Article 1 also notes that "[n]o communication shall be
received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present
Protocol." Id. There are 153 state parties to the ICCPR. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16
December 1966, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005)
(listing the state parties to the ICCPR). There are 104 state parties to the Optional Protocol allowing
individuals to bring complaints before the Human Rights Committee. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 5. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification/5htm#N3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) (listing the state parties to the Optional Protocol).
Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has become a party to the Optional Protocol. Id.
77 See Optional Protocol, supra note 76, at art. 5 (outlining HRC's response to communications
received under the ICCPR).
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The ICCPR's counterpart, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, provides more explicit recognition of the right to
health.78 Article 12 of the treaty requires parties to take steps to meet "the
right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health. 79  The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee further
defined this right in General Comment 14, which established that all health
care services and medications should be available in sufficient quantity, as
well as physically and economically accessible to everyone without
discrimination.8° General Comment 14 also established that the provision of
essential medicines, as defined by the WHO, is one of a state's minimum
core duties under the ICESCR.8 1 Therefore, it seems that the ICESCR
already embodies the right to essential medicines, and that the more than 140
state parties to the Covenant are legally obligated to ensure that their other
obligations-including trading practices-do not violate the right to essential
medicine.
The problem with the ICESCR, however, is its weak enforcement
mechanism. The ICESCR relies on states reporting their progress regarding
human rights to the U.N. Economic and Social Council and does not provide
individuals standing to bring complaints.82 Although it is a legally binding
treaty, the ICESCR depends on political pressure, rather than legal
obligations, to advance and protect human rights.
Many citizens of the world do not have to look to international law
to find a legal right to health, however. More than sixty nations include
some form of a right to healthcare in their constitutions.8 3 National courts in
Costa Rica, India, Colombia, Argentina, and South Africa, among others,
have determined that the state has an obligation to provide drugs for citizens
suffering from HIV/AIDS and other diseases. 84 Some national courts find
the right to health in their own laws, while some courts are willing to apply
78 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220 A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6316/art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing the universal right to "the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health").
79 Id.
so See The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, General Comment No. 14, U.N.
CESCR, 22nd Sess., Agenda item 3, E/C.12/2000/4 para. 12 (2000), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 13, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment
14] (declaring that the right to health must address availability and the "four overlapping dimensions" of
accessibility: nondiscrimination and physical, economic, and information accessibility).
81 Id. at para. 43(d).
82 See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 61, at 8 ("Beyond reporting, few mechanisms exist to
monitor or enforce the ICESCR's provisions.").
83 See Yamin, supra note 44, at 339 (noting that the right to health or healthcare is "enshrined in
over sixty national constitutions").
84 Id. at 340.
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international law domestically. 5 No matter where the courts derive the right,
these national decisions are especially promising for the enforcement of the
right to medicine because (1) local courts can often provide more efficient
relief to citizens, and (2) international law usually requires the exhaustion of
domestic remedies before hearing complaints. 6
International law and the national laws of some states form a basis
for a legally recognized human right to medicine. Even without a specific
reference to human rights in the World Trade Organization Agreements, the
WTO may already recognize a Member State's duty to implement patent
laws in a way that would allow the State to fulfill the human rights of its
citizens. In a 1996 decision settling a dispute between the United States and
Venezuela, the Appellate Body of the WTO found that the WTO Agreement,
which would include TRIPS, "is not to be read in clinical isolation from
public international law. '87 In other decisions, the Appellate Body cited the
case law of international human rights tribunals when interpreting the
provisions of the WTO Agreement. 8 Thus, if a Member State was in a
position to argue that it had the authority to break patents to make AIDS
medicine affordable for its citizens, the TRIPS Council might be willing to
look to other human rights documents to interpret the TRIPS Agreement-
perhaps finding that Article 8's permission to formulate laws to "protect
public health" and to "promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic... development" includes permission to
fulfill the rights recognized in international human rights documents. This
argument seems unlikely to succeed, however, especially since the
discussions in the WTO leading up to the Agreements centered more on
public health emergencies than individual human rights. 89  Therefore,
international human rights documents cannot serve as a substitute for an
explicit recognition of the right to medicine in the TRIPS Agreement. By
embodying the right in the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO would help secure
the right to medicine by supplying Member States with a legal justification
for implementing patent laws that do not impede access to essential
medicines.
85 Id.
86 See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 61, at 8 (noting that individuals have a better chance at
effecting change in their own countries, where they are familiar with the domestic legal and political
processes, and that international law often requires claimants to exhaust domestic remedies as a
prerequisite to relief).
87 WTO Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envir-e/gas le.htm.
88 See GERVAIS, supra note 16, at 343 (discussing the TRIPS dispute settlement mechanisms).
89 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a human rights focus).
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III. Moral Justifications for the Right to Essential Medicine
Although international and domestic law may not yet recognize a
universal, legally enforceable right to medicine, individuals still have a
strong moral justification for demanding access to certain medicines. It is
important not to underestimate the power of moral rights, which are often
precursors to legally enforceable rights and may at times be more effective or
efficient in producing the substance of a right than a legal right would be.90
Henry Shue provides a useful framework for analyzing moral rights
in his Basic Rights. Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy.
91
According to Shue, a basic moral right provides a person with a justified
demand to enjoy the substance of the right, which is socially protected
against "standard threats. 92 To apply this definition to the pharmaceutical
patent context, we must start with the premise that a person has a basic right
to life.93 For a person to enjoy the substance of this right, he must be able to
demand that the right be protected against the "typical major threats" to life.94
The concept of standard threats is fluid, but it seems reasonable to suggest
that treatable diseases pose a standard threat to the enjoyment of the right to
life.
Returning to Vincent's story in Paying the Price, we can see that
Sub-Saharan Africa offers an easy case for viewing HIV/AIDS as a typical
threat to life.95 Despite the sheer number of people suffering from the
disease in the region, however, the threat would not be "standard," in terms
of a moral right, if there were no practical treatment available. Shue
describes the shifting measure of standard threats:
What is ... eradicable changes, of course, over time. Today, we
have very little excuse for allowing so many poor people to die of
malaria and more excuse probably for allowing people to die of
cancer. Later perhaps we will have equally little excuse to allow
deaths by many kinds of cancer, or perhaps not. In any case, the
90 For example, in April 2001, public pressure caused a group of almost forty pharmaceutical
companies to withdraw its suit against the South African government. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 43, at
106 (describing the history of the case). The pharmaceutical companies had raised a challenge under the
South African Constitution to the state's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of
1997, designed to increase the supply of cost-effective drugs by importing generic patented drugs. Id.
91 See generally HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY (2d ed. 1996).
92 Id. at 13.
93 The right to life can be located in natural law, or in religion, or in international or national law;
the origin of the right to life does not matter, as long as one concedes that it exists.
94 SHUE, supra note 91, at 33.
95 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing the AIDS crisis in Africa).
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measure is a realistic, not a utopian, one, and what is realistic can
change.
96
In other words, AIDS would not have been characterized as a "standard
threat" a few decades ago when a diagnosis would have constituted a death
sentence for any person, whether she lived in an affluent nation or a least-
developed country. Fortunately, the reality of HIV/AIDS has changed.
Twelve antiretroviral medicines for the prevention and treatment of
HIV/AIDS now appear on WHO's Essential Medicine list, which by
definition contains only safe and effective medical treatments. 97 In light of
the development of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to treat H1V/AIDS, the
disease fits Shue's definition of a standard threat to the enjoyment of the
right to life. Therefore, people now have a moral justification to demand
access to ARVs to protect their fundamental right to life.
In order to fulfill basic rights, Shue argues that there is a duty to
make arrangements that serve three functions: to avoid depriving people of
the substance of their rights, to protect people against deprivation, and to aid
them when they are deprived of their rights.98 Of course, discussions about
fulfilling basic rights tend to be framed as passive sentences, without
identifying who (or what) will be guaranteeing the right. Governments,
private actors, and non-government organizations are all candidates for
bearing the burden of fulfilling rights, but this paper focuses on the role that
the WTO can and should play in fulfilling the basic right to essential
medicine, specifically ARVs to treat HIV/AIDS.
The WTO, as an international institution, is in a position to fulfill the
first two duties that Shue sets forth. At the very least, the WTO has an
obligation not to deprive people of their right to certain basic medicines by
establishing patent laws that impede access. If, for example, the WTO
agreements allow nations to draft patent laws that increase the cost of ARVs
or prevent the exportation of generics drugs to poor countries, the WTO is in
effect depriving people of their right to medicine. 99 The WTO also has the
obligation to protect people from being deprived of their right to essential
medicine. It is within the scope of the WTO's authority to take a firm stance
on human rights-to recognize a right to life that cannot be derogated by
patents. If the WTO made such a statement, the Member States would have
to respect human rights principles when implementing the WTO agreement
96 Id. at 33.
97 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Essential Medicines (last visited Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.
who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines det/en/index.html, [hereinafter Essential Medicines]; WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, The WHO List of Essential Medicines (last updated Mar. 2005),
http://www.who.int/medecines/publcations/essentialmedicines/en/.
98 SHUE, supra note 91, at 17.
99 See supra note 58 (citing sources finding that patents affect drug prices).
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provisions into domestic legislation. These domestic laws would, in turn,
create the legal framework that controls the pharmaceutical industry.
While many arguments for affordable drugs-including Paying the
Price-target pharmaceutical companies as the primary actors affecting
access to medicine, the focus is misplaced, or at least myopic. Of course, a
strong moral argument can be made for why rich drug companies owe a duty
to fulfill the needs of people suffering from treatable diseases. And,
currently, the pharmaceutical industry does make voluntary efforts to
increase access to affordable medicine. 00 But focusing on the private
companies, rather than on public institutions like the WTO, is not the best
route for guaranteeing people the right to medicine. The voluntary efforts of
pharmaceutical corporations are just that-voluntary.10 1 As Shue illustrates
clearly in Basic Rights, benevolence does not provide any guarantees to the
right holder. 0 2 If the pharmaceutical industry decides that the rewards for
philanthropy are not worth the cost, they may not continue to offer drugs at
reduced prices to poor nations. Public pressure may persuade pharmaceutical
companies to act benevolently for a time, but as Shue notes, "to enjoy
something only at the discretion of someone else ... is precisely not to enjoy
a right to it."' °3 The better approach, then, is to focus on the legal institutions
and public international organizations that can guarantee rights, thereby
relieving pharmaceutical companies of the "benevolent or malevolent
discretion... to decide what counts as benevolent."'04
100 See supra note 12 (citing GlaxoSmithKline's statement of commitment to making medicine
accessible to the developing world); see also International Federal of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association, Vatican Statement on AIDS Demonstrates a Lack of Information on Industry's Actions to
Improve Access to AIDS Medicines (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ifpma.org (describing
voluntary efforts of pharmaceutical industry to improve access to AIDS drugs).
101 But see Lissett Ferriera, Note, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights
Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1133, 1166-73 (2002)
(arguing that transnational pharmaceutical companies have "soft law" obligations to respect the human
rights of HIV/AIDS patients in developing countries, and that pharmaceutical companies violate these
obligations when they oppose countries trying to promote access to AIDS medicine).
102 SHUE, supra note 91, at 78.
103 Id.
104 See id. (describing the need for participatory institutions to guarantee rights); see also CIPR
Report, supra note 58, at 41 (noting that while voluntary differential pricing schemes "are welcome
contributions to improving access to medicines in developing countries ... there is also the need to seek
more broad-based solutions, which are also sustainable, to the serious public health problems that are
being addressed"); WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO & THE
WTO SECRETARIAT 101 (2002) (emphasizing that "donations are not considered to be a long-term
solution to the affordability problem because of their time-limited nature"), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/whowtoe.pdf (Aug. 20, 2002).
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IV Evaluating the Current WTO Intellectual Property
Regime in Light of Human Rights
In light of the moral, and possibly legal, obligations of the WTO
member states to help fulfill the right to essential medicine, do the WTO
agreements regarding TRIPS and public health go far enough?
Commentators have found several reasons to criticize the current state of the
law governing compulsory licensing. One potential problem with the August
30 Agreement is that it requires that someone compensate the patent holder
when a compulsory license is issued.'0 5 Paragraph Four of the Agreement
states that "adequate remuneration" should be paid, "taking into account the
economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been authorized
in the exporting Member."' 0 6 This less-than-lucid definition leaves states the
task of calculating compensation. Malaysia, the first nation to issue a
compulsory license to import generic antiretroviral drugs, decided to base its
rate of remuneration on the per capita income of Malaysians and "the value
of each life which would have been lost had the drugs not been available."
10 7
If the patent holders, Bristol-Myers Squibb and GlaxoSmithKline, do not
agree with the level of compensation Malaysia offers, they may bring a
complaint before the TRIPS Council. 0 8  Whether the remuneration
requirement will turn into a stumbling block for poor nations remains to be
seen, but the Malaysian government's compulsory license should, in the
words of Indian Pharmaceuticals Alliance secretary general Dilip G. Shah,
"provide an interesting test case to assess whether the August 30 decision is
workable or needs modification."'10 9
A human-rights focus could help clarify the remuneration
requirement. Suppose, for example, that Bristol-Myers Squibb and GSK
decide to challenge Malaysia's rate of compensation. If the TRIPS
Agreement recognized a basic right to essential medicine, the TRIPS Council
would have to interpret "adequate remuneration" in light of that right and
find that the rate of remuneration could not exceed the available resources of
the importing state. Of course, the TRIPS Council could make that same
determination from the current language of the August 30 Agreement, but
105 August 30 Agreement, supra note 33, at 4.
106 Id.
107 See Gustav Ando, World's First Compulsory License Issued in Malaysia for Generic
HIV/AIDS Drug, WORLD MARKET ANALYsIs, Feb. 26, 2004 (reporting that the exact calculation for
compensation has not been determined). The Malaysian government has made a contract to import four




the wording of the provision is too vague to meaningfully guarantee
affordable medicine." 0
Public health groups have also argued that the new agreements
require so much red tape that nations will not be able to implement the
compulsory licensing system."'1 The August 30 Agreement does require
importing Members to make three notifications to the TRIPS Council when
importing drugs under compulsory licenses." 2 First, the importing Member
must specify the name and expected quantity of the medicine it will be
importing."1 Second, if the Member is not a "least-developed country" it
must establish that it lacks the manufacturing capacity to produce a sufficient
supply of the medicine it will be importing under the system."14 Third, the
importing Member must confirm that it has granted or intends to grant a
compulsory license in accordance with TRIP Article 31 and the
modifications of the August 30 decision. " 5 The exporting Members actually
bear more of the administrative burden under the system, however. In
addition to notifying the TRIPS Council of the quantities, names, and
destinations of the drugs it will be producing under compulsory licensing, the
exporting Member must make sure that the products are clearly identified to
reduce the risk that they will be diverted from their intended market. 16 The
Agreement states, "Suppliers should distinguish such products through
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products
themselves, provided that such distinction does not have a significant impact
on price.... ,,117
The conditions on compulsory licensing are somewhat burdensome,
but they are necessary to prevent abuse of the system. The WTO has
dedicated a webpage to notifications, so the importing and exporting states
can easily fulfill the reporting requirements online." 8  The accountability
required by the system seems no more tedious than necessary in order to
ensure that compulsory licensing fulfills its purpose of helping nations
110 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing the vague wording of the August 30
Agreement).
I See Elizabeth Becker, Poor Nations Can Purchase Cheap Drugs Under Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2003, at 14 (quoting Doctors Without Borders representative Ellen 't Hoen, who stated that the
August 30 decision "was designed to offer comfort to the U.S. and the Western pharmaceutical industry
.... Global patent rules will continue to drive up the price of medicines.").
112 August 30 Agreement, supra note 33, at para. 2(a).
13 Id. at para. 2(a)(i).
":4 Id. at para. 2(a)(ii).
5s Id. at para. 2(a)(iii).
116 Id. at para. 2(b)(ii).
117 Id.
118 The WTO webpage dedicated to public health notifications can be accessed at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratope/tripse/publichealthe.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
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without manufacturing capability increase their supply of affordable
medicine.
A human-rights focus could also help in this area, though, by
guaranteeing that the system does not become so expensive that it impedes
access to drugs. Specifically, a human rights requirement could be helpful in
determining whether making the drugs identifiable would be "feasible" 9-if
the cost of distinguishing the product could prevent people from being able
to afford the drug, then it would be impermissible under a rights analysis. As
with the remuneration requirement, the TRIPS Council could interpret the
current language of the Agreement-which states that the special packaging
must "not have a significant impact on the price"' 2° -to mean that the cost
must not affect the availability of the drug. But absent a more explicit
statement in the Agreement, the provisions could become too burdensome
for states, thereby allowing patents to prevent access to medicine.
V. Conclusion
Of course, patents are not the only, or even the primary, roadblocks
to accessible medicine in developing nations. Over one-third of the world's
population lacks access to the drugs on the WHO list of Essential Medicines,
the great majority of which are not protected by patents in any country.' 2'
As noted in a joint study by the WHO and WTO, "[t]he fact that billions of
people lack access to essential drugs, most of which are not protected by
patents, underscores the other problems contributing to inadequate access."1
22
The study identifies possible contributing factors to include insufficient
distribution systems, poor financing, lack of capacity to import drugs, and
the affordability of generic drugs for people in poor countries. 1
23
Many critics of compulsory licensing are also quick to point out that
the lack of health-care infrastructure in developing nations "may mean that
even inexpensive medicines are not used, or that they may be misused and
contribute to the emergence of drug resistant pathogens or a virus.' 24 In
fact, one nation has used its own lack of infrastructure as an excuse for not
providing publicly funded AIDS medication. Although the South African
government triumphed over the pharmaceutical companies when it decided
119 August 30 Agreement, supra note 33, at para. 2(b)(ii).
120 Id.
121 See Essential Medicines, supra note 97 (citing statistics for access to essential medicines);
JOINT STUDY, supra note 58, at 96 (noting that the "vast majority of the 300 or so drugs on WHO's Model
List of Essential Drugs are not under patent protection in any country").
122 JOINT STUDY, supra note 58, at 96.
123 Id.
124 See CIPR Report, supra note 58, at 31 (commenting on the problem of inadequate
infrastructures in developing countries).
TOOLS FOR SUCCESS
to break patents to manufacture and import generic drugs to help alleviate the
nation's AIDS epidemic, 25 the government eventually announced that it
would not provide ARV drugs through the public health system because it
lacked the infrastructure to administer the drugs.
126
It does not follow, however, that because additional factors affect
access to drugs the Members of the WTO should not attempt to make
intellectual property laws socially responsible and responsive to human
rights. In the negotiations preceding the August 30 Agreement, the African
Group directly addressed arguments that the access problem involves more
than patents:
Care should be exercised not to use the existence of other
categories of problems as an argument against finding an
expeditious solution [to the compulsory licensing problem]. [T]he
expeditious solution under paragraph 6 [of the Doha Declaration]
should relate to the lack of or insufficiency of local manufacturing
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector, rather than the inadequacy
of infrastructure or even poverty.1
2 7
Undoubtedly, other agents-both public and private-must also contribute to
a comprehensive, effective program to deliver needed medicines to people in
poor countries. The necessity of other actors, however, does not detract from
the role that the World Trade Organization should play in fulfilling the basic
rights to life and health. By shifting its focus from "public health" to
individual human rights, the WTO could improve the clarity and
effectiveness of the measures it has already taken to increase access to
essential medicine.
125 See infra note 61 (discussing the pharmaceutical companies' decision to withdraw their legal
challenge to the South African government's position on patents and AIDS drugs).
126 See PAYING THE PRICE, supra note 2 ("[T]he South African government shocked the world by
announcing that it would NOT start using ARV drugs. It claimed the cost was still beyond the reach of
the public health system which simply did not have the infrastructure to administer the drugs."). Despite
the government's claims, it is important to note that South Africa has greater resources at its disposal than
other African nations that are attempting to supply ARVs through public health programs. Id. This may
be due to the reluctance of the South African government to acknowledge the link between HIV and
AIDS. Id. (quoting a South African man, who refused to accept that he had HJV until he developed full-
blown AIDS, saying "Here in South Africa we always said there is no such thing you know-this disease
is from the other countries like America you know").
127 Joint Communication, supra note 23.

